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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Jose Daniel Robinson, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
ORDER 
Appellate Case No. 20020027-CA 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme 
By reason of the failure of appellee to file appellee's 
brief within the time permitted by Utah R. App. P. 26(a), which 
time expired on June 26, 2002, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the case 
will be submitted to the court on appellant's brief only; 
provided, however, that if appellee's brief is submitted within 
seven (7) days from the date hereof, such brief will be accepted 
for submission without further order of the court. 
Dated this ^jl day of July, 2002. 
FOR IJIB-^ eQURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 3.°\ day of July, 2002, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail to the parties listed below: 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 14 0854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
SHELDEN R. CARTER 
HARRIS & CARTER 
3325 N UNIVERSITY AVE STE 200 
JAMESTOWN SQ CLOCKTOWER BLDG 
PROVO UT 84604 
Dated this ^*? day of July, 2002. 
asr^*Jf A cX*-^) 
lexander 
Clerk 
Case No.: 20020027-CA 
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT, #001403840 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : Case No. 20020027-CA 
JOSE DANIEL ROBINSON, 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing one count of 
manslaughter, a second degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (e) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the magistrate err when it dismissed the manslaughter 
charge against defendant after the state adduced sufficient 
evidence at the preliminary hearing to support a reasonable 
belief that he acted recklessly in retrieving, handling, and 
discharging a loaded handgun while under the influence of 
alcohol? 
Whether to bind a defendant over for trial on a criminal 
charge presents a question of law. On appeal, that determination 
is reviewed for correctness, with no deference accorded the 
1 
magistrate's decision. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, % 8, 20 P.3d 
300 (citing State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465-66 (Utah 1991)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205, governing manslaughter, provides 
in pertinent part: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of 
another[.] 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205(1) (a) (1999) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103, providing definitions for 
culpable mental states, provides in pertinent part: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he is aware of 
but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(3) (1999) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of 
manslaughter (R. 1). After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate 
dismissed the charge for lack of "probable cause to believe that 
defendant's actions were reckless" (R. 32-33). This timely 
2 
appeal followed (R. 34-35) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On June 9, 2000, defendant came home from work late in the 
evening and joined his sister-in-law in the living room, where 
they drank beer and watched television together (R. 36 at 10). 
At about 1:15 a.m., defendant went to his bedroom and retrieved a 
.38 handgun that he kept in his closet (Id. at 11). Returning to 
the living room, defendant handed the gun to his sister-in-law, 
who was seated on the sofa. He sat down opposite her, about six 
feet away, on a love seat (Id. at 12). 
As his sister-in-law was handling the gun, defendant heard 
the slide activate. He went over to her, asked for the gun back, 
and returned to the love seat (Id.). Noticing that the barrel of 
the gun was protruding slightly and thinking that the weapon 
might be jammed, defendant pulled the slide back to clear out any 
obstruction (Id. at 13). As he did so, a round ejected and fell 
to his feet. Defendant picked up the bullet and put it in the 
clip (Id.). According to defendant, the gun was either in his 
hand or resting on his leg at this point. The next thing 
defendant remembered was that the gun fired. He then looked over 
towards his sister-in-law and saw her slumped over the arm rest 
of the couch (Id.). She had been hit in the neck by a bullet 
1
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution. State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 437-38 (Utah 
1999)(citations omitted). 
3 
from his gun. She died shortly thereafter from the injury (Id. 
at 7-8). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The only issue in this case is whether the evidence of 
defendant's recklessness was sufficient to sustain a bmdover on 
the manslaughter charge. 
The probable cause threshold for bmdover at a preliminary 
hearing is not high. The prosecution is charged only with 
producing a sufficient quantum of evidence "to support a 
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the 
defendant committed it." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, § 16, 20 
P.3d 300 (citation omitted). In assessing whether the evidence 
established a reasonable belief, the magistrate views all 
evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution. State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 
1229 (Utah 1995)(citation omitted). Because the state's evidence 
will likely only get stronger between the time of the preliminary 
hearing and the time of trial, even "close calls" should result 
in bmdover. Id. 
The evidence reached this threshold for bmdover as a matter 
of law. The preliminary hearing court had before it evidence 
that defendant, who had been drinking, retrieved a handgun from 
his bedroom and gave it to his sister-in-law (R. 36 at 10-11). 
When he heard the slide activate, he took the gun back (Id. at 
4 
12). The evidence also showed that defendant pulled the slide 
back, ejecting a bullet on the floor. He then consciously 
replaced the bullet in the clip (Xd. at 13). And the evidence 
showed that the gun subsequently fired, killing the victim (Id. 
at 7, 13). Under the circumstances, the evidence and fair 
inferences that could be drawn from it establish at least a 
reasonable belief that defendant was actually*aware of but 
disregarded a significant risk of harm and that disregarding the 
risk constituted a gross deviation from what a reasonable person 
would do. Accordingly, the magistrate erred when it refused to 
bind the case over for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED WHEN IT 
DISMISSED THE MANSLAUGHTER CHARGE 
BECAUSE THE STATE ADDUCED 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TO SUPPORT A 
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT DEFENDANT 
ACTED RECKLESSLY IN RETRIEVING, 
HANDLING, AND DISCHARGING A LOADED 
HANDGUN WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALCOHOL 
The magistrate in this case refused to bind defendant over 
on the charge of manslaughter and dismissed the case. In so 
doing, the magistrate ruled: 
Having heard the evidence in this case, 
this court concludes that, as a matter of 
law, there is not probable cause that 
defendant was aware of but consciously 
disregarded a "substantial and unjustifiable 
risk" that his conduct might result in the 
death of another. This court also finds that 
5 
any risk which did exist was not of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard would be 
a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise. 
Accordingly, this court finds that this 
matter should be dismissed. 
R. 32-33 or addendum A. While the magistrate's ruling states the 
law of recklessness correctly, it fails to apply that law to the 
specific facts of the case in light of the quantum of evidence 
necessary to support a bindover. When the proper standard is 
applied to the facts, the error in the magistrate's ruling 
becomes clear. 
To bind a defendant over for trial, the prosecution must 
demonstrate probable cause "by present[ing] sufficient evidence 
to establish that 'the crime charged has been committed and that 
the defendant has committed it.'" State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 
1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h) (2)). The 
evidence necessary to establish probable cause at this stage of 
the proceedings is "relatively low because the assumption is that 
the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the 
investigation continues." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 182 
(Utah 1998)(citing Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229). Thus, a 
preliminary hearing court must bind over for trial whenever the 
state presents "sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, § 16, 20 P.3d 300 
(citation omitted)(emphasis added). This is the same quantum of 
6 
evidence necessary to support an arrest warrant. Id. The 
magistrate, in making this determination, "should view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve 
all inferences in favor of the prosecution." Pledger, 896 P.2d 
at 1229. 
In order to establish a reckless mental state, the State had 
to demonstrate both subjective and objective components of 
defendant's perception of the risk.2 State v. Singer, 815 P. 2d 
1303, 1307 (Utah 1991) (citing State v. Wessendorf, 777 P.2d 523, 
525-26 (Utah App. 1989)). First, from a subjective standpoint, 
the state had to show that defendant was aware of but consciously 
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct 
could result in the death of another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
103(3)(1999); Singer, 815 P.2d at 1307. And second, from an 
objective standpoint, the State had to show that the risk was of 
such a nature and degree that disregarding it amounted to a gross 
deviation from the standard of care an ordinary person in 
defendant's position would have exercised. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-103(3); Singer, 815 P.2d at 1307; Wessendorf, 777 P.2d at 526; 
2
 On a continuum of mental states, "recklessness is not 
marked by a sharp analytical line." State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 
1303, 1307 (Utah App. 1991). Whether conduct has crossed over 
into recklessness is "[i]n essence[,] . . . a matter of judging 
when conduct is no longer just gray but dark gray." Id. Once 
the state establishes a reasonable belief that defendant acted 
recklessly, then the magistrate should bind over, leaving the 
ultimate determination of whether defendant acted recklessly to 
the jury. See State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
7 
State v Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983). Measuring the 
evidence of defendant's conduct against the correct legal 
standard for a bmdover demonstrates the legal error m the 
magistrate's conclusion that the state failed to produce 
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that defendant 
acted recklessly. 
First, the evidence reflects that defendant subjectively 
knew of the specific risks inherent in his conduct. While the 
gun was in his sister-in-law's possession, defendant heard the 
slide activate and responded by immediately taking the gun away 
from her (R. 36 at 12). The fair inference from this conduct is 
that the sound of the slide activating alerted defendant to an 
increased risk of serious harm, to which he responded by 
regaining possession of his weapon (Id.). Defendant also knew, 
by the bulge in the barrel, that something was mechanically amiss 
with his gun (Id. at 13). In response, he pulled back the slide 
and saw a bullet fall out (Id.). He then consciously replaced 
the bullet in the clip (Id.). At this juncture, he actually knew 
that the gun contained at least one live round. Indeed, his own 
volitional act had loaded the gun. 
It is reasonable to infer that one who possesses a gun knows 
that pointing it at another human being in a potentially loaded 
condition is a risky proposition. In this case, after defendant 
replaced the bullet in the gun, the gun discharged and hit the 
8 
victim in the neck (Id. at 8). The only fair inference from this 
fact is that the gun, which was in defendant's possession, was 
pointed at the victim when it discharged. 
The evidence also demonstrates that defendant consciously 
disregarded the risk inherent in playing with guns. The state 
adduced evidence that defendant had been drinking between 10:30 
p.m., when he arrived home from work, and 1:15 a.m., when the 
shooting occurred (R. 36 at 10-11).3 After taking the weapon 
back from his sister-in-law, defendant consciously pulled back 
the slide and, instead of unloading the gun, chose to reload the 
magazine, which he then knew contained at least one live round 
(Id. at 13). Defendant thus disregarded the substantial risk 
inherent in handling a deadly weapon, which directly resulted in 
his sister-m-law' s death. 
Second, the State adduced evidence pointing to the lethal 
combination of a loaded gun and intoxication. This combination 
suffices to establish probable cause that defendant's conduct, 
when viewed objectively, constituted a gross deviation from the 
standard of care an ordinary person in defendant's position would 
have exercised. State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 
1981)(exploring parameters of "gross deviation" and concluding 
3
 After the shooting, according to the investigating 
detective, defendant "appeared intoxicated" (R. 36 at 16). A 
subsequent toxicology report, showing a blood level of .10, 
confirmed the officer's observation (R. 8). 
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that the divergence must be "extreme"); State v. Whitehead, 2001 
UT App 385 (concluding that defendant's handling of gun in close 
proximity to others constituted "gross deviation" supporting a 
finding of recklessness where he knew that his action would load 
the gun); cf. State v. McPhee, 684 P.2d 57, 58 (Utah 
1984)(concluding that the conduct of defendant, who drank half a 
bottle of vodka, drove, and subsequently killed a child on a 
bicycle, constituted a "gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary prudent person would indulge"). 
Under the record facts of this case, because the magistrate 
had sufficient evidence before it to establish probable cause 
that defendant acted recklessly, it should have bound defendant 
over for trial and left adjudication of the merits to the trier 
of fact. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse the 
magistrate's order dismissing the case and order that defendant 
be bound over for trial on one count of manslaughter, a second 
degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 1 day of May, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of appellant were mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to Sheldon Carter, attorney for appellee, 3325 North 
University Avenue, #200, Provo, Utah 84604, this cr\ day of May, 
2002. 
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Addendum A 
\^/5/i\ ^ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSE DANIEL ROBINSON i 
Defendant(s). 
ORDER DISMISSING CASE 
Case No. 001403840 
JUDGE: GARY D. STOTT 
This is a prosecution for Manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony in violation of 
UCA 76-5-205. On September 6, 2001, this matter came on for a preliminary hearing. At that 
hearing the following facts were established: 
On or about June 10, 2001, defendant was at home with the his sister-in-law, the victim, 
Christina Galbraith. Both defendant and the victim were drinking. At some point during the 
evening, defendant retrieved a .380 semiautomatic pistol and showed it to the victim. After the 
victim handled the gun, defendant took the gun and cocked it by pulling back on the slide. 
When defendant pulled back the slide on the gun, a bullet was ejected and fell on the 
carpet. Defendant retrieved the bullet and replaced it in the clip of the gun. Defendant was either 
holding the gun in his hand or on his lap when it discharged. 
The gun fired a bullet which struck the victim in the head immediately behind the left ear. 
Page 1 of 2 
The victim died as a result of this injury. 
The cnme of manslaughter requires that the actor "recklessly causes the death of another 
. . . . " UCA 76-5-205(1 )(a). In this case, it is undisputed that defendant has caused the death of 
another. The court however, does not believe that there is probable cause to believe that 
defendant's actions were reckless. Specifically, the term "recklessly" means that the actor acted: 
Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct 
or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
UCA 76-2-103(3) 
Having heard the evidence in this case, this court concludes that, as a matter of law, there 
is not probable cause that defendant was aware of but consciously disregarded a "substantial and 
unjustifiable risk" that his conduct might result in the death of another. This court also finds that 
any risk which did exist was not of such a nature and degree that its disregard would be a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise. Accordingly, this 
court finds that this matter should be dismissed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: h V*/ 
District Court .radge 
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